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University of Florida Law Review
Vol. III

SPRING 1950

No. 1

NEW FLORIDA COMMON LAW RULES
JoHN T. WIcoGurroN

Since the Blount Code of 1829, which adopted as the basic law
of Florida the general common and statute law of England as it
existed upon the Declaration of Independence, 1 the legal profession
of our State has been shackled with the strict, technical common law
forms of pleading. Many years ago England repented, 2 with the
result that today it has a greatly simplified code of pleading; yet
down through the ages Florida has stubbornly adhered to this timeconsuming and archaic system of legal procedure. The only justification for this static condition was evidently grounded upon the
theory that in law, as in good liquor, age possesses virtue.
Finally, however, our Supreme Court emancipated the bench and
bar of Florida by the entry of its order of November 22, 1949, adopting new rules of civil procedure,3 effective January 1, 1950, and

IFrA. STAT. §2.01 (1949), from Fla. Terr. Act of Nov. 6, 1829, §1. This
includes the common and statute laws of England of a general and not a local
nature down to July 4, 1776, if not inconsistent with federal law or Florida
statutes. Note also FLA. STAT. §§2.02-2.04 (1949). Cf. the evolutionary sketch
in Legis., 3 U. or FLA. L. REv. 74 (1950).
2
The progress in England ranges from The Common Law Procedure Act,
1852, 15 & 16 VicT., c. 76, and The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18
125, through The Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act,
VicT.,.
1925, 15 & 16 GEO. V, c. 49, to the current Rules of the Supreme Court made
by the Rule Committee pursuant to this statutory authority.
3
The new Florida Common Law Rules are cited herein as FLA. C. L. R.; the
new Florida Equity Rules, as FLA. EQ. R. The word "old" precedes the citation
in references to the former rules. A limited supply of copies of the rules and
of the order of promulgation was immediately printed and distributed by the
Statutory Revision Department of the Office of the Attorney General of Florida;
and the new rules are included in the recently published FLA. STAT. 1949. Copies
of the rules were promptly printed and distributed by West Publishing Co. to
each Southern Reporter subscriber.
The petition of the Florida State Bar Association for promulgation, together
with the then proposed Florida Common Law Rules, appeared in 41 So.2d No.
4 Advance Sheets (Aug. 25, 1949). That draft does not, of course, include the
changes later made by the Supreme Court of Florida, such as those in FLA.
C. L. R. 13(b), separating motions for special and general appearances, and in
35(b), retaining non-suits.

(1)
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governing the pleading, practice and procedure in all actions at law,
suits in equity or proceedings commenced or instituted after this
effective date in our circuit courts, civil courts of record and county
courts, so far as these new rules are applicable thereto. 4 No longer
will the lawyer be forced to use, as the tools of his profession, procedure fashioned in the prevailing modes of 1829. He can now serve
the public with modem equipment, comparable to that used in
other professions.
The time for this is long overdue. If developments made since
the turn of the century in the X-ray machine had been withheld
from the medical profession until the year 1950, many of us would
not be here to consider the consequences. If the farm-tractor and
other mechanized tools of agriculture developed in the past thirty
years had not been made available for use until this year, the world
would be much hungrier or far less populous. Yet the lawyer has
until recently been struggling along with the selfsame tools handed
his grandfather over a century ago; and with these tools he has
tried to keep his profession abreast of the time, when time itself has
become increasingly of the essence. The failure of our profession to
correct this condition earlier is one of the important factors contributing to the disrepute in which we are now held by some segments of
our society.
Admittedly, no set of rules can be devised that will convert poor
lawyers into good ones or transform mediocre judges into outstanding
jurists. The success or failure of the new rules, therefore, will depend
largely upon intelligent and diligent use of them by the bar, and a
common-sense interpretation and application of them by the courts,
compatible with just and prompt results.
The major changes in our sytem of pleading under the new rules
apply chiefly to common law actions. Inasmuch as the important
changes in chancery practice are those necessary to conform the time
of pleading to that of actions on the law side of the court,5 the bulk
of this discussion will be directed to the common law rules, officially
designated as the "Florida Common Law Rules."
4

The term "county courts" includes both the county judge's court in each
county and the county court in counties having one. It should be noted that
the order of promulgation specifically states that the rules of procedure existing
at its date of entry continue to govern all actions, suits or proceedings commenced or instituted prior to Jan. 1, 1950.
5
Chancery practice was largely brought up to date by the Chancery Act of
1931, FLA. STAT., c. 63 (1949).
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Even as to these, this article does not purport to paraphrase or
even to mention all of them, but rather to focus attention on the
broad picture and its chief structural components as they stand today.
A still further limitation is necessary in an article of this length and
purpose; the normal use of the new procedural system is presented.
This pattern is not mandatory, however, and profitable variations
exist under certain rare circumstances. The permissibility of these
tactical shifts should be ascertained from the rules themselves in such
instances.
I.

ScoPE AND NATUrE

The new Florida Common Law Rules embody no innovations in
pleading. They consist of some of the old provisions brought forward
in their original form, others preserved in amended or modified
form, and still others adapted from the system of procedure now
being used in the federal courts. Each rule has, therefore, been
tested in active practice and found workable. The chief objectives
sought by the promulgation of these rules may be said to be threefold: to insure as nearly as possible that the side of the controversy
that ought to prevail will prevail; to permit speed, as distinct from
haste, in the final disposition of the cause; and to reduce the procedural cost to the litigants.
7
The new rules apply in their entirety to all common law actions.
They likewise apply to all special statutory proceedings, except as
to the form, content, procedure and time for pleading therein." The
reason for restricting the applicability of the rules with respect to
statutory proceedings is evident. Florida has in its statutes many
special proceedings, such as eminent domain and bond validation, in
which each step is clearly specified. The form of the pleadings required therein is relatively simple, and the time for filing them is
greatly accelerated as compared to the old common law system of
procedure. Modification thereof by general rules is accordingly unnecessary, and might well produce undesired results in practice.
6E.g., the motion for summary judgment is available to defendant as soon
as he receives the complaint; and thereafter, or, in the absence of such motion
by defendant, at any time after the expiration of twenty days from commencement of the action, this motion may be made by plaintiff, FLA. C. L. R. 48.
As a practical matter, however, neither will use it so early in the litigation as
a general rule; cf. the analysis in III, 8 infra.
7Fr.. C. L. R. 61.

Bibid
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A careful analysis of the rules in their entirety demonstrates that
each is an indispensable and integral part of the whole and has a
direct relationship to the others. When they are employed properly
in handling the various stages of the proceeding, the real issues are
highlighted rapidly and a decision on the merits reached effectively.
Jurisdictional and related preliminary matters can be readily settled at
the outset. Thereupon, assuming that the particular cause can proceed
at all in the form instituted, either it is rapidly disposed of by judgment on the pleadings or by summary judgment without the necessity
of waiting for trial, or the issues are so narrowly limited that a minimum of time, effort and expense is consumed during the trial.
By these rules, all technical common law forms of pleading are
abolished. The declaration, plea, demurrer, replication, rejoinder,
and other paraphernalia are things of the past;' 0 in their stead are
substituted merely the complaint and the answer, together with a
reply when the answer contains a counterclaim or cross-claim or
when, after written notice and application, a reply is permitted as
necessary to meet an affirmative defense."
II.

PExADINCS

1.

Complaint

As in the federal practice, the action is commenced by the filing
of a simple complaint,' 2 setting forth a brief and concise statement
of the cause of action.' 3 If it informs the defendant of the nature
of the action, it is sufficient.' 4 The claim may be made either directly
9

FLA. C. L. R. 9(a); cf. FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 8(e)(1).
10 FLA. C. L. R. 8(d), which is a modification of FED. R. Crv. Pnoc. 7 and

old FLA. C. L. R. 15.
"FLA. C. L. R. 8(a), which is based largely on FED. R. Crv. PRoc. 7.
12
FLA. C. L. R. 4, which is a combination of FED. R. Crv. PRoC. 3 and old

FLA. C. L. R. 11.
13 FLA. C. L. R. 9(b). This rule is an adaptation of old FLA. C. L. R. 20 and

FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 8(a). The provisions of FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 7, 8 have been
used as a basis. It should be noted, however, that the Florida rule is predicated
upon a cause of action rather than a claim for relief; of. FLA. C. L. R. 9 (b). Alternative statements of the claim or defense, as provided in FED. R. Cxv. Paoc.
8(e)(2), have been incorporated in FLA. C. L. R. 9(b), (g), but the federal
authorization of the hypothetical claim or defense has not been adopted.
4
FLA. C. L. R. 9(b); see note 13 supra.
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or in the alternative, thus eliminating the multitude of almost wholly
repetitious counts, in which only one or two words are changed to
meet the alternative situations that might develop on trial'15 The
pleader may state in his complaint a demand for as many types of
relief as he believes are warranted, whether based upon the same or
different causes of action.10 Each claim grounded upon a separate
transaction and involving a separate set of circumstances must be
alleged in a separate paragraph. 17 Duplicity and repetition are not
permitted.' 8
Upon the filing of the complaint, process issues forthwith.'1 This
conforms to the procedure in equity,2 0 eliminates the praecipe for
summons, and avoids the delay previously experienced between the
issuance of summons and the filing of the declaration. Still more
important, it removes the opportunity for merely entering an appearance on the first Rule Day after receipt of summons and then filing
an answer on the Rule Day following entry of appearance. The
answer is now due within twenty days of receipt of summons, and
in itself constitutes an appearance.
A copy of the complaint must be furnished by plaintiff to be
served upon defendant with the summons. 21 The officer making
service is required to endorse the date thereof on the copy of the
summons left with the defendant, so that his attorney will know the
exact day on which the time to plead commences to run. 22 No time,
therefore, will be lost by the defendant's attorney in apprising himself of the grounds upon which his client is being sued, or in determining the exact date on which a copy of his defensive pleadings
' 5 See note 13 supra.
16Fr.. C. L. R. 9(b), (g). The cause of action on which the claimed relief
is based must be pleaded, of course, unless later allowed by amendment under
FLA. C. L. R. 15(a) or tried by express or implied consent under FLA. C. L. R.

15(b).
17FLA.

C. L. R. 9(f), taken from FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 10(b).

18Ibid.
1

9FL..
C. L. R. 5(b); cf. 4(a). FLA. C. L. R. 5 is a modification of old
FLA. C. L. R. 12, 14, and Fa. R. Crv. Pnoc. 4(c). The provision of the latter
freely permitting service by a person specially appointed by the court has been
eliminated in order to avoid transgressing upon the perquisites of the sheriffs
office. Special appointments may be made under this rule provided the sheriff
is disqualified
or unable to act, but this situation will arise in rare instances only.
2
0Fr.. EQ. R. 5; cf. 4(a).
2iFr.. C. L. R.5(i), (g).
22
FLA. C. L. R.5(g).
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must be served upon opposing counsel. The attorney for defendant
is thus relieved of the necessity of making trips to the courthouse.
and of having a copy made of the complaint, in order to complete
his office file.
2.

Motions Used as Preliminary Tools

Under the new rules the efficient use of motions takes on an added
2 3
importance. Some are available as soon as the complaint is served.,
Their purpose is to avoid unnecessary trials, and to assist in shaping
the real issues in those causes in which a trial is essential to a proper
decision on the merits. In other words, they are special tools of the
profession, to be used at the times and for the respective purposes
for which they have been fashioned, either to terminate the process
of construction by the adverse party of his building at the earliest
feasible stage, or to cut down the size of what remains to be
constructed.
Although each type of motion is of course valuable in effectuating
the purpose for which it is specially designed, five stand out as major
tools. These are the motion to dismiss the complaint, the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the motion for summary judgment, the
24
motion for a directed verdict, and the motion for a new trial.
The first tests those elements in the cause that, while logically
no more nearly essential than any other of its elements, are peculiarly
suited to initial disposition; they are not only basic but readily determinable. In the main they are jurisdictional; they go to the question, broadly speaking, of whether any building permit has been
obtained.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings, once the jurisdictional
requisites are met, checks the architectural designs, the blueprints,
of the cause as conceived by plaintiff and defendant; if either blueprint fails to conform to any pattern known to the law, there is no
need for investigating the availability of the materials to be used in
construction, that is, the evidentiary facts.
The motion for summary judgment, assuming that jurisdiction exists
23

E.g., motion to dismiss, FLA. C. L. 11. 13(b); motion for more definite
statement, FLA. C. L. R. 13(e); motion to strike, FLA. C. L. R. 13(f). Note
the general provisions regarding motions in FLA. C. L. R. 7(c), 8(b), (c).
24
FLA. C. L. R. 13(a), (b), (g), (h); 13(c); 43; 40; 41. These are discussed individually hereinafter, each under its own subheading.
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and that a cause of action has been formulated, focuses attention
on the character and amount of factual evidence available. The
stage of mere allegations has at this point been passed through;
on this motion the court rules on whether the party against whom
it is directed can produce, for purposes of actual construction, material of the type required to follow out his particular blueprint,
that is, whether he is prepared to present for the record evidentiary
facts tending to establish those conclusions of fact that are essential
to his cause. If he cannot, a trial is still a waste of time and effort.
The fourth and fifth motions, for a directed verdict and for new
trial, can be considered together. The former is available after the
plaintiff's evidence is in, or after both the plaintiff and the defendant
have rested their cases; the latter can be used only after the verdict
has been rendered. These are the final trial tools. They examine the
buildings as ultimately constructed by either party; and one of
these may be adjudged structurally unsound by the court, without
resort to those last inspectors, the gentlemen of the jury.
We now turn to certain of the motions individually.
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. This motion may be filed separately, within ten days from the service of a copy of the complaint, or
alternatively certain of its grounds may be incorporated in the answer. 25 It is predicated on one or more of seven specified defenses: 2 6
"(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
lack of jurisdiction over the person;
improper venue;
insufficiency of process;
insufficiency of service of process;
failure to state a claim or defense upon which relief can
be granted;
(7) failure to join indispensable parties."

Analysis shows that defense 3 is waived unless raised either on motion or in the answer or other pleading; defenses 2, 4 and 5 must be
made by separate motion, if at all, and are waived unless so presented; conversely, defenses not enumerated among the seven must
25

FLA. C. L. R. 13(b), (h).
61bid. Defense 7 was not added to Fm). R. Cxv. Pnoc. 12(b) and 12(h)
until Dec. 27, 1946.
2
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be asserted in the responsive pleading rather than on motion, and if
not included therein are waived; defenses 6 and 7 may be made either
on motion, or in the original pleading, or by a later pleading if one
is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the
trial; and defense 1 warrants dismissal at any time, whether raised
by suggestion of the parties or otherwise. 27 Defenses 2. 4 and 5
result in a special appearance, as distinct from a general one. 28 In
particular, it must be borne in mind that an attempt to plead these
defenses in conjunction with any of the other four or, in other words,
to combine special and general appearances, results in a general
appearance and forfeiture of these defenses. 29 The federal practice
is the opposite on this point, it might be added. 30
As regards jurisdiction of the person, it is of course elementary in
the law of conflicts that a judgment in personam, upon any attempt
to effectuate it by action on the judgment in another jurisdiction,
can be challenged on the basis of this defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person; 3 ' but the result elsewhere does not affect the
3 2
validity within Florida of the Florida judgment.
Speaking very generally, the motion to dismiss is the successor to
the now obsolete pleas in abatement, and to some extent of the old
demurrer, 33 from the standpoint of function. But there is this significant difference: the motion fight is settled in two rounds at most.
Only one motion to dismiss may be made on special appearance and
one on general; each must include all available defenses that can
be made therein, and those not included are waived. 34 As a practical
matter, of course, the effect of this provision is not so broad as its
language indicates at first glance; defenses 2, 4 and 5 must be made
27
These results follow from reading in conjunction FLA. C. L. R. 13(b),
(g), (h).
28This is apparent in FLA. C. L. R. 13(b).
29Ibid.
30
FED. R. Cry. PRoc. 12(b), as amended Dec. 27, 1946.
31
E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945). For a concise
statement of the types of collateral attack possible without violation of the full
faith and credit clause, U. S. CONST. Art. IV, §1, see 2 U. OF FLA. L. REV.
136 (1949).
32
The requirements of procedural due process, U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV,
must of course be observed; e.g., compare Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457
(1940), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878).
33
This is true of defense 6; cf., e.g., SULLIVAN, FEDaAL RULEs OF CIVI

PnocrEuaE 629 (1949).
34

FLA.

C. L. R. 13(g).
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by motion only, and cannot be combined with 1, 3, 6 and 7, while
1 can be made at any time. Nevertheless, the statement that the fight
must be settled in two rounds is correct as a generalization in the
sense that no defense except number 1 can be asserted on motion
and again in a later motion or pleading, and that those defenses
are waived unless made at the proper time
that can be combined
35
and together.
Dismissals. A word of caution is perhaps necessary, inasmuch as
some are inclined to regard the granting of a motion to dismiss as
an adjudication without prejudice. Involuntary dismissal, on any
ground other than lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, is a dismissal with prejudice unless otherwise specified in the order.3 6 So
also is a voluntary dismissal ... . when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of this State an action based on or including the same claim." 37 If dismissal without prejudice is desired
and can be obtained, counsel must be on the alert to see that the
order so states. Conversely, a first voluntary dismissal without prejudice may be taken by notice or by stipulation, and also by order of
the court; if it is to be with prejudice, specification to this effect is
required in the stipulation or order. 38
Non-Suit. In Florida, as distinct from the federal practice, a nonsuit,39 including our unique 'involuntary non-suit,"40 may still be
taken pursuant to any applicable statute; the privilege of withdrawing without prejudice, when an adverse ruling is made by the court,
is not lost in this state after one such withdrawal.4 1 The plaintiff
35

B. 13(g), (h).
C. L. R. 85(b). This follows FED. R. Civ. Puoc. 41(b), with the important difference of saving non-suit in Florida.
3
FrLA. C. L. R. 35(a)(1), following FED. B. Crv. Pnoc. 41(a)(1). Note
that no voluntary dismissal sought otherwise than by stipulation can be taken
unless notice thereof is filed before service of the answer and also before service
of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party.
38
FLA. C. L. B. 35(a)(1),(2); see note 87 supra.
39This may be taken at any time before the jury retires from the bar of the
court, FLA. STAT. §54.09 (1949).
40
0n involuntary non-suit in Florida, see, e.g., Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 139 Fla. 328, 344-345, 190 So. 533, 540 (1939); J. Schnarr &
Co.41v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp., 118 Fla. 258, 159 So. 39 (1934) passim.
FL&. C. L. R. 35(b). At common law involuntary non-suit was unknown;
for an excellent historical summary see the opinion of Van Devanter, J., in
Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364, 392-395 (1913).
3

FLA. C. L.

0FLA.
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10

can come back and annoy the defendant again and again.
This exception checkmates to a large extent the other salutary
provisions limiting freedom of dismissal without prejudice. The federal practice regards non-suit as what it really is, namely, a form of
dismissal; consequently non-suit is not mentioned, and only one dis42
missal of this nature is automatically allowed without prejudice.
The wisdom of the Florida liberality in thus allowing one dismissal
without prejudice after another, provided only that such dismissal
is taken as a non-suit, is subject to serious criticism; but, for the
present at least, non-suit has been retained.
Motion for More Definite Statement. In some instances a pleading either requires or permits a responsive pleading, but is so phrased
that even a skilled legal analyst cannot fathom just what it means.
The problem here is largely one of rhetoric. A more definite statement may be requested, provided the movant points out the defects
complained of and the details desired. 4 3 An order granting this motion must be obeyed; failure to do so promptly results in the striking
44
of the pleading, or in some other appropriate order.
The old motion for a bill of particulars is gone.4 ' This conforms
to the current federal practice, in which this motion was for long
permitted but was eventually found to be largely a favorite screen
it produced is
for fighting a mere delaying action. 46 Whatever good
47
today better achieved by deposition and discovery.
Motion to Strike. This motion is designed for those situations in
which sham pleadings are filed, 48 or in which a portion of a pleading
is unnecessary because redundant, immaterial, impertinent, scanda42

FED. R. Civ. Pitoc. 41(a), as amended Dec. 27, 1946. The reason for the
federal elimination of non-suit is clearly expounded in Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Osher & Reiss, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 985, 1009 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
43
FLA. C. L. R. 13(e), which is the same as FED. R. Civ. Paoc. 12(e).
44Ibid.

45This motion does not appear in the new rules; therefore FLA. C. L. R. 8(a)
bars it.
46
FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 12(e) was amended Dec. 27, 1946, so as to eliminate
this motion, which had been under heavy fire for some time.
4"Discussed in III, 1 infra.
48

FLA. C. L. R. 14. Old FLA. C. L. R. 22 extended to all pleadings. Contrast
FED. R. Crv. Pnoc. 11. Note that FLA. C. L. R. 14(b) requires the motion to
strike sham pleadings to be sworn to.
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lous, or insufficient as a defense. 49 It may be made at any time before
responding to such pleading or, when no responsive pleading is permitted, then within ten days aftez service of the defective pleading. 50
The court51may also accomplish this result on its own initiative at
any time.
8. Answer
The defendant is required to file his answer or defensive pleading
within twenty days from the date of service of the summons and
copy of the complaint. 52 Like the complaint, the answer is but a
short and simple statement of the defense against each claim asserted
by the plaintiff and denied by the defendant. 53 Controversion of all
averments may be effected by general denial; but in any event all
averments of the opposing party must be either admitted or denied,
and if less than all are denied, specification is required. 54 This procedure eliminates the practice, which with some lawyers has grown
to be a custom, of filing a number of separate pleas to each count
of the declaration.
It is, of course, incumbent upon the defendant to plead affirmatively
the several defenses enumerated in the rule, as well as any other
affirmative defense; failure to do so constitutes a waiver thereof. 55
It should be pointed out, however, that the rules very wisely permit
the parties to raise at the trial those defenses or objections that cannot
be known except upon the taking of testimony during the trial;
these are not considered waived if not pleaded beforehand.5 6
49

FLA. C. L. R. 13(f).
5Olbid. Note that FED. B.

Crv. PNoc. 12(f) allows 20 days rather than 10.

51Ibid.

O2 FrA. C. L. B. 18(a). This replaces old FLA. C. L. B. 21, and is taken
largely from FED. R. Crv. Paoc. 12(a). It should be noted, however, that in

Florida the only motion that tolls the running of the 20-day period for filing
the answer or reply is the motion to dismiss, and even so the responsive pleading
must be served within 10 days of either denial of the motion or postponement
of a ruling thereon unless a different time is fixed by the court. A motion to

strike, or for more definite statement, does not affect the time-limit prescribed

in the rule.
S3FLA. C. L. B. 9(c), taken from Fan. R. Civ. P.Roc. 8(b).
541bid. Averments in a pleading requiring a responsive pleading are admitted
if not denied, with one exception, namely, those as to the amount of damages,
FLA.C. L. R. 9(e). Cf. FED. B. Crv. Paoc. 8(d).
55
Fr.A. C. L. B. 9(d), taken from Fmn. B. Cv. Ploc. 8(c).
56FrA. C. L. R.15(b), a modification of FED. B. Civ. Pnoc. 15(b).
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If the answer asserts a counterclaim, the plaintiff must plead to
57
it within twenty days from the service of a copy thereof on him.
Failure to so plead constitutes an admission of the averments in the
counterclaim. 58
There are certain situations in which a pleading sets up a claim
for relief to which no responsive pleading is required. In these instances, failure to deny the averments of the claim does not constitute a waiver, and the opposite party is privileged to assert at
the trial any defense thereto that he may have, either at law or
in fact.5 9
4.

Reply

The reply, if any, is always filed by the plaintiff, but its function
is really that of an answer in those instances in which he is placed,
as a tactical matter, in the position of a defendant. It is allowed in
two instances: to defend against a counterclaim, in the sense of setoff or recoupment, or a cross-claim60 advanced in the answer; and
to meet an affirmative defense.6 1 In this latter event, written applito opposing
cation for leave to file the reply, and notice thereof
62
counsel, are mandatory if a reply is to be submitted.
At this point it is well to observe that "No pleadings, other than
motions provided by these Rules, shall be allowed or required . . ."
in addition to the complaint, the answer, and, when appropriate, the
reply. 63 Considerable freedom to amend is accordingly to be
expected.

5. Amendments
Amendments to pleadings are allowed liberally, in order that the
parties may be afforded full and complete opportunity to reach the
64
merits squarely. Florida Common Law Rule 15(a) provides:
57

FLA. C. L. R. 13(a), taken from FED. R. CIV. Pnoc. 12(a).
FLA. C. L. R. 9(e), taken from FED. R. Civ. Proc. 8(d).
59Ibid.
6OThe counterclaim is one against the plaintiff, of course, while the crossclaim is one against some other party related to the transaction constituting
the subject-matter of the action.
61
FLA. C. L. R. 8(a), a modification of FFD. R. Crv. Paoc. 7(a).
621bid.
631bid.
64This follows Fr. R. Civ. Pftoc. 15(a).
58
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"A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted
and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires."
Indeed, all issues tried by the express or implied consent of the
parties, even though not in the pleadings, are to be treated as raised
therein. 5 Amendments may be made, on motion, at any stage of
the proceeding or trial-even after judgment-whenever they are
necessary to conform the allegata to the probata, but failure to so
amend does not affect the result of the trial of such issues. 60
This liberalization in pleading permits and encourages the parties
to bring a case to issue in a minimum length of time, thereby speeding its final disposition. The practical effect should be of considerable
benefit to the busy practitioner, who realizes that his compensation
is not measured by the length of time that he holds a case in his
office, although these opportunities for forcing an early issue will
perhaps be unwelcome to the lawyer who capitalizes on his ability
to keep a case in court indefinitely. Quite apart from the personal
attitude of the individual attorney, however, those members of the
bar that seek to enhance the prestige of and confidence in our profession will heed the recent paraphrase by Mr. Justice Thomas of
Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights: "... justice delayed may well
be justice denied."6 7
6. The Abolition of Rule Days
To accomplish acceleration in time of pleading, it was necessary
to abolish the archaic practice of observing Rule Days. 8 The logical
and historical basis for Rule Days is obscure;6 9 but in any event the
65FLA. C .L. R. 15(b), taken from Fa. R. Civ. PROC.

15(b).

OGIbid. Amendment of the pleadings after judgment is permitted for the
benefit of those to whom form is paramount. The practical effect is nil.
67
Justice Without Delay, 2 U. ov FLA. L. R~v. 1 (1949).
08

FLA.

C. L. R. 5(a).

G0 In the early days in England, certainly through the reign of Henry III
and probably into that of Edward III, pleadings were made orally until definite

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss1/1

14

Wigginton: New Florida Common Law Rules
14

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

practice became obsolete even before the advent of the typewriter
and stenographic assistance. For many years pleadings have been
typewritten and filed with the clerk on the day required by law,
with the result that any valid reason for the original practice has
long since ceased to exist.
The abolition of Rule Days is nevertheless the phase of the new
rules that is perhaps the most misunderstood and criticized. At the
outset it can be asserted confidently that the time saved in bringing
a case to issue is in itself sufficient justification for abolishing this
obsolete custom. Furthermore, it is significant that not a state in the
Union has revised its rules of procedure in the past quarter of a
century without eliminating this practice. One can hardly ignore
this trend, chosen after careful thought by the best of those juridical
minds in the United States devoted intensively to the improvement
of judicial administration.
Complaint has arisen chiefly from the lawyer who practices alone,
and who feels that the Rule Day procedure affords him a definite
date on which he may file his pleadings, leaving him comparatively
free during the remainder of the month to attend to other phases
of his practice-and to do a little hunting and fishing on the side.
Even this objection, however, completely ignores the fact that Rule
Days are not observed after the initial defensive pleading is filed.
From then until the conclusion of the case the court fixes the time
for subsequent pleadings, not necessarily to coincide with Rule
Days but as often as not, on other days of the month. The practitioner
under the old rules was accordingly forced to keep a daily docket
anyway in order to handle his pleadings properly, much in the same
manner as is now required if he is to file his pleadings on time.
We are all familiar with the monthly annoyance and confusion
experienced, particularly by the attorney living outside the countyseat, in trying to determine the current status of his various cases
on the day following Rule Day. The courtesy of exchanging copies of
pleadings under the old system was never universally observed. Toissue was reached. Entries of these were inscribed by an officer of the court
on a parchment roll, which constituted the "Record." Gradually the barristers
began to enter their own pleas on the roll with a view to saving time; and the
opponent had access thereto in preparing his answer. Around the time of Edward

IV, pleaders developed the practice of delivering their pleas in writing; entry
thereof on the roll was made subsequently as a matter of convenience. Cf. 25
HAtmzsnny, LAws or ENGLAND 24, n.(a) (2d ed., Hailsham, 1937).
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day this chore is eliminated; it is no longer necessary, except for
the purpose of satisfying one's curiosity, to visit the courthouse or
to look in the court fie of the case under consideration, for the reason that from the filing of the complaint until the entry of the judgment each party is required to serve upon his adversary a copy of
each pleading in the cause.7 0 Time does not commence to run until
a copy of the pleading is served on counsel, irrespective of when it
is filed with the clerk. It is anticipated, therefore, that the elimination of Rule Day practice will prove of considerable benefit in the
handling of the pleadings, particularly as regards those lawyers
living away from the county-seat, and will conserve much of the
time and energy heretofore spent merely in checking dockets and
making office copies of pleadings fied by opposing counsel.
7. Verification, Service, and Computation of Time
71
Verification. Verification of pleadings is no longer required.
Assuming that at one time there may have been a valid reason for
such formality, the attorney of today is expected as a matter of
course to stand behind his work and to plead honestly and accurately.
Should he choose not to do so, the value of verification as a prod to
the shyster or the sluggard can be measured with a micrometer only.

Certificate of Service. As an aid to the attorney in conserving
both his stationery and the time of his secretaries, the old form of
certificate proving service of copies of pleadings has been abolished.
That form necessitated one secretary, to make affidavit that a copy
had been mailed to or served on opposing counsel, as well as another
secretary in the office to notarize the affidavit. The new rules provide
for a simple statement, signed by the attorney, stating that the copy
of the pleading has7 2been furnished to opposing counsel, either by
delivery or by mail.
70

FLA.

C. L. R. 6(a), taken from FED. R. Crv. Poc. 5(a).

71FLA. C. L. R. 12(a), following FED. R. Crv. Poc. 11. This is new, but it

has a statutory basis also. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25441, effective June 13, repealed
FLA. STAT. §52.01 (1941), which prescribed sworn pleas.
72
FLA. C. L. R. 6(f), which takes the place of old FLA. C. L. R. 10. The
new provision sets forth the form of the certificate, which constitutes prima
facie proof of proper service and should normally be endorsed on the face of
the pleading filed with the court.
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Computation of Time. The method of computing time is set forth
clearly and succinctly in the rules. 73 The first day from which
a designated period begins to run is not counted; the last day is,
unless it be a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event time runs
"... until the end of a next day which is neither a Sunday nor a
holiday."
Intermediate Sundays and holidays do not count in a period of
time amounting to less than seven days. A half-holiday is not considered a holiday; it counts as a full day. For service by mail, three
74
days are added to any given period prescribed.
A copy of any motion not ex parte, as well as a copy of notice of
hearing, must be served at a "reasonable" time before hearing.75
This provision has purposely been made flexible, inasmuch as the
amount of time necessary will vary with the number of motions and
the nature of each, as well as with other factors.
Enlargement of most of the periods prescribed by the rules or
by court order can be made in the discretion of the court to relieve
hardship not occasioned by culpable neglect. 76 In this, as in many
other matters of procedure, a wise exercise of discretion on the part
of the judge must be assumed.
8.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A few causes, at least, can be won at this stage of the litigation,
without expenditure of further time and effort. "After the pleadings
are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party
may move for judgment on the pleadings." 77 For this purpose all
facts well pleaded are assumed to be true; evidence does not enter
into consideration at this point. Nevertheless, it may be that the
pleadings of one party fail to make out a case, even assuming that
all his allegations or averments can be proved; and accordingly a
decision can be rendered at once and the necessity of trial obviated.
A judgment rendered pursuant to this motion is a final decision
on the merits. Denial of the motion, on the other hand, merely continues the proceeding, with the emphasis shifted to the evidentiary
7

8FI"

74

75

76

C. L. R. 7(d), taken from FD.R. Civ. Paoc. 6(e).
FLA. C. L. R. 7(c); contrast FED. R. Crv. Pnoc. 6(d).

F.

77

C. L. R. 7(a), taken from FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 6(a).

FLA.

FLA.

C. L. R. 7(b), taken from FED. R. Civ. PRaoc. 6(b).
C. L. R. 13(c), taken from FED. R. Crv. Pnoc. 12(c).
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phase. The function of the motion, in other words, is that of a demurrer. But it is not just the same old girl in a new dress. To repeat,
it is made after the pleadings are completed. And it is made only
once, if at all, by either party.
III.

PRETaRIA

IMPLEMENTS

1. Deposition and Discovery
After the issues have been made by the pleadings, the more interesting phase of the new procedure commences. It is from this stage
until the time of trial that most cases will be won or lost. The rules
on deposition and discovery furnish the attorneys ample opportunity
to demonstrate their prowess and ingenuity, especially in view of the
fact that the process can be started as soon as the action is
78
commenced.
No attempt will be made here to set forth in detail the mechanics
of this procedure, inasmuch as a masterful presentation of it by
W. 0. Mehrtens, of the Miami Bar, has appeared in a previous issue
of this publication. 70 Reference to the rules on deposition and discovery will accordingly be made in a very general way; for a more
complete understanding of the rules themselves the reader is directed
to the article by Mr. Mehrtens.
As soon as the pleadings are settled, time and expense can be saved
by requesting the opposite party to admit certain facts alleged in
either the complaint or the answer.8 0 He is not, of course, expected
to concede the existence of those facts upon which the very issues of
the case against hin will turn, but he is expected to admit those
relevant allegations of fact that are well known to both parties as
78

FLA. C. L. R. 20, which is substantially the same as Fim. R. Crv. Pnoc. 26.
For the plaintiff to serve notice of intent to take a deposition within 20 days
after commencement of the action, leave of court, obtained with or without
notice of application therefor, is required. Cf. also FLA. C. L. R. 21, which is a
modification of FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 27, 28, and deals with depositions made
before action, for the purpose of perpetuation of testimony.
79
Deposition and Discovery in Florida Under the Federal Rules, 1 U. or
FLA. L. REv. 149 (1948).
s0FLA. C. L. R. 29, which is the same as FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 36. Actually,
if counsel finds practical reason for doing so, this may be done immediately after
commencement of the action. The answering party is not making an admission
for any other purpose, and it cannot be used against him in any other proceeding.
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facts and as easily susceptible of proof. 8' Either pleader must reply
to any service of a request for admission of facts or of the genuineness of documents within, normally, ten days from the date of service;
otherwise the matters as to which admission is requested will be
considered admitted. 82 If he does answer, he must either admit the
facts requested and the genuineness of the documents in question,
or file his sworn statement of denial, or submit for a ruling by the
83
court his written objection to the request, setting forth his grounds.
A party denying the facts or the genuineness of documents does so
at his peril. If their truth or genuineness is subsequently established,
the sucessful party is entitled to a judgment for the expenses thereby
84
incurred, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
After all facts alleged in the complaint or in the answer have been
admitted or denied, each party is then in a position to employ the
remaining rules on discovery in an effort to ascertain the evidentiary
facts upon which the opposite party relies in support of his position.
This may be done through written8 5 or oral 86 interrogatories propounded to the parties or their witnesses. The basic philosophy of
the rules on discovery is that ideally each side should know, before
trial, all the relevant evidentiary facts. Although this goal is usually
impossible of attainment in practice, discovery is offered as a powerful tool for reaching it.
This underlying philosophy was implicit throughout the opinion
87
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Hickman case,
in which the spirit of the comparable rules prevailing in federal prautice was interpreted. Parties, including their employees, and witnesses may be forced to relate all of the facts known to them concerning the cause of action pleaded. Furthermore, upon a proper
showing of necessity, even the attorneys representing the parties may
in certain circumstances be required to disclose to their adversary
any written statements obtained personally or furnished to them
81By amendment of Dec. 27, 1946, FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 36(a) was amended

for the specific purpose of permitting a request for admission of facts not necessarily set forth in some document involved in the request. FLA. C. L. R. 29(a)
adopts
this revised phrasing.
8 2FA. C. L. R. 29(a).
83Jbid.
84

FLA. C. L. R. 30(c), which is the same as FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 37(c).
FLA. C. L. R. 24, taken from FED. R. Cirv. Paoc. 31.
86FLA. C. L. R. 23, which is a modification of FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 30.
87ic
v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947).
85
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by investigators or others having knowledge of the facts. The only
absolute exceptions to this latitude are confidential information vouchsafed to the attorney by his client, and other communications that under
established principles of law are considered privileged."8
Another principle, which appears at first to be an exception, concerns the work-product of the mind of the attorney in preparing
his case. His pleadings disclose the theory of his cause, of course,
while his briefs and oral argument set forth his supporting reasons.
His planning and preparation, however, should obviously inure to
the benefit of the individual that pays him, namely, his client; it is
not the mission of discovery to enable a party to sit idly by and
obtain the fruits of the labors of counsel for the adverse party merely
for the asking. Accordingly, although on occasion facts that are both
relevant and non-privileged may be gathered even from opposing
counsel, the burden of establishing a necessity for invading his privacy in the preparation of his case rests on the invader; and a mere
showing of convenience will not suffice.
The reason for the latitude allowed by the courts in employing
the discovery process is obvious. The purpose of a lawsuit should be
to discover the truth concerning the transaction occasioning the action.
Justice cannot be predicated upon concealment and fabrication. No
reason in logic or fair-dealing can justify either party in withholding
from the court or from his adversary the facts of the case known to
him. The discovery procedure takes much of the hocus-pocus out of
the practice of law and makes it less of a cat-and-mouse game, played
by skilled counsel, in which the party represented by the more clever
lawyer will prevail.
Too many miscarriages of justice have resulted from surprises
during the trial, staged by astute lawyers able to conceal the facts
until such time as opposing counsel is unable or unprepared to
cope with them. Such occurrences have at times caused the public to
look with justified suspicion and contempt upon both the courts
and the legal profession. This hazard can be reduced through the
proper use of the discovery rules. Experience has shown that if all
of the facts upon which a cause of action or defense is based are
known to counsel for both parties early in the proceeding, the case
88n general, the other two grounds of any importance are protection from
self-incrimination and communications from one spouse to the other in the confidence of the marital relationship; for a detailed discussion see Mehrtens, supra
note 79, at 168-172.
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is often settled upon an agreeable basis, thereby conserving the time
of the trial court and relieving the appellate court of much of its
burden.
The cause of judicial administration in the employment of the
discovery process received a shocking jolt when the Supreme Court
of Florida rendered its decision in the case of Atlantic Coast Line
R. R. v. Allen.8 9 The plaintiff sought by discovery to secure written
statements of witnesses to the accident from the superintendent of
defendant railroad, but the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that discovery cannot be extended to such lengths. Ironically enough, the decision was based squarely on the contrary pronouncement of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Hickman case,90 which
involved an attempt by plaintiff to secure through the deposition of
attorney for defendant certain statements of witnesses obtained by
him in anticipation of litigation for use therein. The issue below was
whether the doctrine of privilege between attorney and client relieved the attorney of the necessity of disclosing these statements
to the plaintiff. The district court, rejecting the claim of privilege,
adjudged the attorney in contempt for refusal to obey an order to
produce; the circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court, but not on the ground of privilege or
because of any antipathy to fishing expeditions in the traditional
sense. Instead, it predicated its decision on the failure of plaintiff to
meet his burden of establishing necessity.
The deposition, it should be noted, was sought from counsel, and
not from a mere employee, as in the Coast Line case. "1 In holding
that the statements sought by plaintiff were not privileged, the Supreme Court of the United States said :92
"We also agree that the memoranda, statements and mental
impressions in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the
attorney-client privilege and hence are not protected from discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the
content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the federal
8940 So.2d 115 (Fla.
2889 (1949).

1949); for an early criticism see 2 U. oF FLA. L. REV.

OHickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 509 (1949), cited in Atlantic C. L.
R. R.v. Allen, 40 So.2d 115, 116 (Fla. 1949), as the correct exposition of the law.
91
Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Allen, supra note 90.
92
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S.495, 508 (1949).
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courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from his witnesses while acting for
his client in anticipation of litigafion. Nor does this privilege
concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his
client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
legal theories."
The federal interpretation of the discovery rules is based upon
93
the philosophy propounded as follows by the Court:
"We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are
to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can
the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled
from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing
the possibility of surprise."
The Court did deny any right in the plaintiff to secure the statements under the circumstances, but on the sole ground of his failure
to establish unavoidable prejudice in the preparation of his case
without the requested statements from opposing counsel. As the
opinion puts the matter: 94
"For aught that appears, the essence of what petitioner seeks
either has been revealed to him already through the interrogatories or is readily available to him direct from the witnesses
for the asking."
The decision, in summary, held that as a matter of public policy the
discovery rules are not to be so employed as to permit the taking of

93/d. at 507.
941d.

at 509.
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depositions from attorneys in the case except upon a strong and
clear showing of necessity-and then only when the information
sought is not privileged.
Careful analysis demonstrates that the interpretation of the discovery rules announced in the Hickman case is diametrically opposed
to that advanced in the Coast Line case. It is hoped that in the nottoo-distant future, the Supreme Court of Florida will see fit to
overrule its interpretation in the latter case and permit in Florida
the full use of the discovery process in accordance with the philosophy upon which it is predicated.
2. Pretrial Conference
Once the issues are settled, a pretrial conference is normally of
great benefit. Its purposes are summarized as follows: 95
"(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action."
Inasmuch as simplification of the issues and desirable amendments
to the pleadings are a part of the overall goal, the phrase "After all
issues are settled . . ." signifies, in practical effect, that stage at which
the preliminary motions and original pleadings have respectively been
ruled upon and completed.
It must be remembered, of course, that in any event the court
fixes the time for such conference, even when it is mandatory, on
some date prior to the trial. The right of either counsel to insist
upon a conference does not authorize him to demand that one be
held immediately; the determination of the most auspicious time
for it rests with the judge. An illuminating article on this entire
subject by James Alger Fee, eminent attorney, jurist and writer,
and also a judge who has made pretrial conferences work in prac95

FLA. C. L. R. 16, taken from FED. R. Civ. PROC. 16.
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tice, has heretofore appeared in these pages; 96 reference is made
thereto for a clear and comprehensive grasp of the basis for, and of
the results that can be accomplished by, pretrial conferences. The
ensuing comments on the mechanics of this rule and the office it
serves will accordingly be of a general nature.
Our Florida rule has been taken wholly from the federal practice,
with one important amendment. While the federal rule renders the
granting of the pretrial conference optional with the court, our
provision makes such a conference mandatory upon the request of
either party;9 7 and of course it may be compelled by the court even
in the absence of request. Now that this tool is complemented in
Florida by the motion for summary judgment,0

8

its utility should

99

be doubly effective.
The benefits flowing from the pretrial conference are many. At
times it results in the disclosure for the first time of facts that lead
directly to the entry of a summary judgment. Or again, it may at
least bring into sharp relief the need for amendment of the pleadings,
thereby insuring consideration of the case on its proper bases. Its
greatest advantage, however, lies in separating the wheat from the
chaff of the cause as pleaded, that is, in defining the issues actually
and in good faith controverted, in narrowing the scope of the proof
required of either party, and in minimizing the quantum of evidence that will be required at the trial in order to construct such
proof. In addition, the law of the case is usually settled by the court
in such a conference, thereby informing counsel for both parties as
to the burden on the issues of fact that each will have to carry
when submitting these to the jury.
As a result of this clarification, crystallized in the order entered
at the pretrial conference, a minimum of time and effort on the part
06justice in Search of a Handmaiden, 2 U. or FLA. L.

REv. 175 (1949).

This article also contains a keen analysis of the merits and disadvantages of
common law pleading.
97
Contrast FLA. C. L. R. 16 with FED. R. Crv. Pnoc. 16. Subpar. (5) of
the federal rule has been eliminated, and subpar. (6) is numbered (5) in the
Florida rule.
98
See III, 3 infra.
99
The pretrial conference without summary judgment was authorized in
Florida by an order of our Supreme Court of Jan. 12, 1940, effective Feb. 1, for
optional adoption by each circuit court and civil court of record by a vote of
a majority of its judges. But the conference could not be compelled by counsel,
and no motion for summary judgment was provided.
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of counsel, and of expense to the parties, is consumed in the trial
itself, if indeed a trial proves necessary. Furthermore, such a conference tends to acquaint the judge fully with the gist of the case
before he takes the bench on the day of trial; and he is thus far
better prepared to expedite the proceeding in a sound and orderly
manner. A free expression of opinion by him during the conference
as to the real issues in the claim or defense, as well as with regard
to the apparent availability of the evidence necessary to support
these issues, results in many settlements that would not otherwise
be made.
Admittedly the pretrial conference will achieve nothing at the
hands of an unskilled or reluctant judge. Like much of our AngloAmerican law in action, its utility in practice depends upon acumen,
resourcefulness, a background of experience, intellectual integrity,
and a smooth blend of forcefulness and tact, in the individual presiding. In other words, it is not foolproof. But, when conducted
properly, it is of great assistance, both to the court and to counsel
in the case.
8.

Motion for Summary Judgment

After the issues of ultimate fact upon which either side relies have
been clearly stated of record, 100 the opposing attorney may profitably turn to the rule on summary judgments in exploring further
the possibilities of concluding the case without a trial.'"' This motion looks to the availability of evidentiary facts. It seeks to determine whether there are not at least some alleged issues of fact as to
which in reality no substantial controversy exists, and, in the light
of this determination, either to terminate the litigation or in any
event to narrow its scope to those issues that unavoidably involve a
sifting of available evidence that will be sufficient, if believed, and
that accordingly must be weighed. If either party can show from
the admissions and depositions on file, including those obtained by
discovery,"1 2 that the claim or defense asserted against him is with10

0

FLA. C. L. R. 43, which is the same as FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 56. This is the
normal tactical time, although the motion can be made sooner; see note 6 supra.
'O'Discovery usually precedes the pretrial conference, as a practical matter.
The conference can then be fully effective, and may well produce a settlement
instances.
in many
1 2
0 Cf. FLA. C. L. R. 43(c); see III, 1 supra.
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out any substantial basis in fact, a summary judgment may be entered
by the court. This result may also be effected by supplementing the
admissions and depositions in the record with supporting affida03
vits, which in turn may be met by opposing affidavits.'
Even at this point the evidence filed or promised as available may
prove to be manifestly inadequate. For example, in an action in tort
for damages it may appear clearly that there is no evidence of damage, or that there is no possibility of establishing negligence on the
part of the defendant. Either ruling disposes of the case.
Furthermore, even if the record at this point shows that only one
portion or aspect of the claim or defense stands without substantial
controversy, a summary judgment may adjudicate at least this part
or aspect with finality.'" 4 For example, the amount of damages may
be fixed without a finding of negligence, or conversely the existence
of negligence may be settled without a determination of the amount
of damages caused by it. If the judgment adjudicates only a portion
of the controversy as originally raised by the pleadings, the remaining issues are disposed of at the trial in the usual manner.10 5
This rule is of tremendous benefit to the conscientious attorney in
dealing with a party that has either instituted an action or fied a
defense for the sole purpose of embarrassment, annoyance or delay.
In such instances it is not necessary to wait until the term of court
convenes or until the case is reached on the docket for trial, inasmuch as the rule permits a speedy and final conclusion of the cause
whenever this is warranted by an obvious lack of available
substantiation.
IV. TIAL
1. Use of the jury
The Florida Common Law Rules follow the federal practice in
providing that trial by jury is waived unless demanded by counsel
for one of the parties. 10 It should be emphasized, however, that
10 7
this request must be made in either the complaint or the answer;
103FLA.

C2.L. R. 43(e); cf:. 43(f), (g).

10 4FLA.

C. L. R. 43(d).

lOSIbid.

C. L. R. 31, a modification of FED. R. Civ. Paoc. 38.
167Tbid. The federal provision allows request in writing up to not later than
10 days after service of the last pleading directed to the issue on which trial
by jury is sought.
l06FrA.
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otherwise it comes too late. The departure here from the corresponding federal rules is worthy of attention. Specification of particular
issues is not authorized in the Florida practice, 08 and the deadline
for requesting a jury is set at an earlier stage. 1"0 Counsel genuinely
in doubt as to the desirability of a jury will accordingly do well to
request one, and to attempt a stipulation of waiver later if this
seems advisable at such time.
While preserving the constitutional right to a jury trial, this new
provision should go far toward clearing many of our congested
dockets. Under the old procedure, a trial by jury could be waived
by stipulation; but this procedure cast upon the attorney for each
party the burden and responsibility of making such a recommendation to his client. The hazard of giving this advice manifests itself
in the event of an adverse judgment; in such instances it has always
been difficult for the losing attorney to convince his client that waiving
a jury was the wiser course.
Logically there may be little if any difference between the old
and new provisions, but psychologically the difference is tremendous.
It is highly desirable in many instances, from the standpoint of both
parties, to have the case decided by the court without a jury. In addition, the time required for the trial, as well as the expense to the
taxpayer, are greatly reduced. The new rules relieve the attorney
of the responsibility of making affirmatively a recommendation of
waiver to his client, yet they preserve the right to demand a jury
whenever one is definitely desired.
2.

Direct Examination of a Party by Opposing Counsel

The rule permitting the calling of an adverse party,' 10 which in
Florida is new, hastens considerably the possibilities of looking
straight to the bottom of a weak case, and forestalls in many instances the familiar muddying of the waters that all too often is
carefully planned. Any unwilling or hostile witness may still be
interrogated by leading questions."' But now, even at the very outl 08 Contrast
09
Contrast

FLA.
FLA.

C. L. R. 31 with FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 38(c).
C. L. R. 31 with FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 38(b); see note 107

supra.
110

FLA. C. L. R. 37, which is the same as FED. R. Civ. PRoc. 43(b).
"'Ibid. Note, however, the interplay of FLA. STAT. §§90.09, 90.10 (1949).
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set of the trial, an adverse party may be called, interrogated by
leading questions, contradicted, and impeached, just as if he had
previously been called by his own counsel. The method of the exarination, in other words, is that of cross, but its scope is that of
direct.
Furthermore, his own counsel may in turn contradict and impeach
him, and may immediately cross-examine him, provided such crossexamination does not stray outside the bounds of the examinationin-chief. Needless to say, this cross-examination by counsel for the
party so called to the stand is designed to rehabilitate him; and for
this reason the provision that he may be "cross-examined" is perhaps
somewhat misleading if not considered in its context. Its true significance, however, can be succinctly expressed in a few words: the
aim of such examination is that of redirect, but its scope is that of
cross. It has been effectively used in other jurisdictions.11 2 It does
not, of course, deprive counsel for such party of his right to call
his client to the stand later, at the proper stage of the trial, for the
purpose of testifying on direct examination in the regular manner.
S. Motion for a Directed Verdict
The motion for a directed verdict is functionally akin to the motion
for judgment on the pleadings, but it is designed for a subsequent
phase of the litigation, namely, the evidentiary stage. It is a tool to
be used later than the motion for summary judgment.
Specifically, the first opportunity to make it arises at the close of
the presentation of evidence by the adverse party; and the specific
grounds on which it is based must be stated.1 1 3 If it is granted, the
necessity of introducing countervailing evidence is obviated; if it
is denied, the movant may proceed with his own evidence just as
if he had specifically reserved the right to do so.114 The second opportunity comes after all the evidence is in; if the motion is not
112See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 897,
419 (D. D. C. 1946), reo'd, 833 U. S. 864 (1948). The reversal has no relationship to the procedural point here discussed. For use of this type of examination in states authorizing it by statutes similar to FLA. C. L. R. 87, see, e.g.,
Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d. 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944); Waller v. Sloan, 225
Mich. 600, 196 N. W. 847 (1928); Langford v. Issenhuth, 28 S. D. 451, 184
889 (1912).
N. 1W.
' 3FLA. C. L. B. 40(a), taken from FED. B. Civ. Puoc. 50.
ll4Ibid.
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granted, the court is nevertheless deemed to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to later determination of the legal questions
raised by the motion.115
Two important consequences are produced by this provision. In
the first place, within four days after reception of the verdict or
discharge of the jury, as the case may be, another motion may be
made by a party that has already moved for a directed verdict,
namely, a motion for judgment in accordance with the original motion for a directed verdict. 116 If the jury has rendered its verdict,
this second motion should also include a request that such verdict
be set aside, along with any judgment already entered pursuant
thereto. 11 In the second place, the specific reservation of jurisdiction below, originally found necessary in the older federal practice in Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 1I1 qualifying the
opinion in Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 119 is not required in
Florida; such reservation is incorporated in the denial or failure to
grant as a matter of law,120 with the result that, provided a motion
for a directed verdict was made below at the close of all the evidence, the appellate court may send down its mandate directing
entry of the verdict requested by the motion.
One further point should be noted: to this motion may be joined
a motion for new trial, provided both are made after the return of
or failure to return a verdict; and a ruling on them should be prayed
for in the alternative, 1 2 1 inasmuch as it is obviously impossible to
grant both motions.
4.

Motion for New Trial

Even though a directed verdict does not seem warranted by the
evidence, the motion for new trial is still available. Its grant results
in a stalemate; trial begins afresh, but at least the loser has another
chance, if warranted. Needless to say, this motion, with full under115

FLA. C. L. R. 40(b), taken from FED. R. CiV. PROC. 50(b).
11Ibid. Note that the Florida time-limit is 4 days, as contrasted with the
federal 10.
117Ibid"
118295 U. S. 654 (1935).
119229 U. S. 364 (1913). This was a 5-4 decision of at best dubious logical
validity; the sweeping language of the majority opinion is far too broad.
12
"FLA. C. L. R. 40(b), which conforms to the current FED. R. Civ. Pnoc.

50(b).
12

1FLA.

C. L. R. 40(c), which is taken from FED.
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lying reasons, must be submitted in writing, either to the trial judge
or on the motion docket, and its filing does not preclude entry of
judgment on the verdict. 122 It must be made within four days after
rendition of the verdict, unless the trial judge, within this brief period
and for cause shown, sees fit to extend the time to a total not in
excess of fifteen days from such rendition. 1 23 Three days' notice of
24
the time and place of hearing must be given to opposing counsel.'
A new wrinkle has been added to our system of procedure in an
effort to eliminate further technicalities that ofttimes result in gross
injustices. The rule relative to motions for new trial provides that
all alleged errors specified therein may be reviewed by the appellate
court, whether or not they relate to rulings on matters in pais or
matters of record. 125 Under the old system of procedure, an error of
the court in ruling on a matter of record could not be reviewed unless a motion in arrest of judgment had been made and denied,
while an error committed in ruling on matters in pais could be reviewed on appeal if, and only if, assigned in the motion for new
trial. This distinction is now abolished; any alleged error of the court,
previously reached by the several and distinct motions in arrest of
judgment, for a directed verdict, non obstante veredicto, for refusal
to admit evidence, for failure to exclude evidence incorrectly admitted, and for new trial, may be reviewed today on the one motion
for new trial if incorporated as grounds therein.'12
5. Exceptions and Instructions to the Jury
Exceptions are unnecessary for appellate purposes, provided of
course-and these provisos are important-that objection is made
and considered by the trial court, that substantial rights of the complaining party are affected, and that the thing said 12or7 done before
or during trial or after verdict is assigned as error.
Requests for instructions to the jury on the law must be filed, at
the latest, upon the closing of the evidence.128 These must be in
2

C. L. R. 41(a); this entire rule differs considerably from the corFED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 59.
responding
123 FLA. C. L. R. 41(b).
12 4
FLA. C. L. R. 41(c).
125FLA. C. L. R.41(d).
12 FLA.

l26This conclusion follows, of course, from FLA. C. L. R. 41(d).
27
1 FLA. C. L. R. 39(a), a modification of FED. R. Civ. Pnoc. 46.
8
12 FLA. C. L. R. 39(b), a modification of FE). R. Civ. Poc. 51.
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writing, and are to be followed by a conference among counsel and
130
the court. 129 All objections must be made and ruled upon thereat;
furthermore, neither any instruction given nor any instruction omitted
may be later assigned as error unless specifically objected to or requested, respectively, at such conference."'
V. EXTRAORDINARY WrITS
The new rules establish a uniform system of procedure for the
handling of extraordinary writs.1 3 2 It will be recalled that under the
common law rules previously in existence the matter of handling
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
the constitutional stay writs, was vested almost entirely in the discretion of the several circuit judges. The resulting variation produced
an unsatisfactory result, in that attorneys practicing in one circuit
were unable to plan properly the procedure of their case if the action
had to be instituted in another circuit observing a local custom unknown to them.
Our new provisions are taken largely from the comparable rules
in force in the Supreme Court of Florida, although each such directive has been modified to some extent in order to meet in general the
type of practice normally followed in the circuit courts. 33 It is anticipated that through this uniformity of procedure the attorney will
be in a position to prepare his pleadings in proper form and to know
in advance how to advise his client intelligently with reference to
the time element involved in concluding the case, whether the action
is commenced in his home circuit or some other.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is the
adoption of
step in the
is a subject

belief of a great majority of the Florida Bar that the
the new rules of civil procedure is an important forward
improvement of judicial administration in this state. It
on which a committee of the Florida State Bar Associa-

129Ibid.
13Obid.
13bid.
132F.A.

C. L. R. 54-60.

course, concern our Supreme Court, our circuit courts, and the Court of Record for Escambia County only; of. FLA. CONST.
133The extraordinary writs, of

Art. V, §§5, 11, 39.
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tion has worked constantly for the past twelve years, in cooperation
with a committee appointed by the Supreme Court of Florida. The
Court itself has maintained a sympathetic interest throughout the
various stages of the work done in formulating the new rules; and
it deserves the gratitude of the entire bar for its action in formally
promulgating them.
This acknowledgment would not be complete, however, without a
special word of sincere tribute to Mr. Justice Glenn Terrell, who
served as Chairman of the Court Committee throughout its entire
existence. His many years of untiring research on the subject, his
thorough understanding of the practical problems confronting the
busy lawyer of today, and his insistent determination to bring our
procedural processes abreast of the times, were a vital force in
achieving culmination of this work. The new rules of civil procedure
will stand as an ever-living monument to the tireless labors he performed in bringing them into reality; and for these efforts the bar
will be eternally grateful.
The new rules of civil procedure, while preserving the distinction
between law and equity, harmonized so closely the procedure, not
only as between actions at law and suits in chancery in our state
courts, but also as between state and federal court proceedings, that
little difference remains. The attorney is free to devote his time and
energy to protecting the substantive rights of his clients, and is
relieved of the oppressive burden of continually differentiating between the three distinct and unrelated systems of procedure heretofore prevailing.
The concept underlying the system established by the new rules
manifests itself in their practical effect. Under the old common law
procedure, despite its logical symmetry, entirely too much emphasis
was placed upon the pleadings themselves. The skillful pleader possessed a distinct advantage, regardless of the facts supporting his
position. By shrewd manipulation he could often plead his adversary
completely out of court, or at least drive him into an untenable
position that could not be maintained at the trial. This practice
produced numerous injustices, with the result that a mockery was
made of our courts in many instances. The art of pleading became an
end in itself, rather than a means to a legitimate end.
Under the new rules, the issues are still framed by the pleadings,
but the emphasis has been shifted from the art of pleading to the
substance of the case itself, as embedded in the evidentiary facts.
Ready tools are provided for locating and crystallizing these facts,
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both by deposition and discovery and at pretrial conference. Other
tools, in the form of motions, are available to fashion the real issues
of the case, and to terminate the litigation at the earliest feasible
stage. Wide latitude is accorded in making amendments to pleadings,
so that the issues in litigation can be drawn by the facts themselves
rather than by the pleadings. Issues not raised by the pleadings, if
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, are treated in
all respects as if they had been raised therein. Amendments may be
made at any time, when necessary either to make the allegations
conform to the evidence or to raise those issues based upon such
evidence. This can be done before trial, during trial, or even after
judgment.
The emphasis has thus been shifted from the problem of pleading
to the problem of proof. At the same time, the development of this
proof is no longer deferred until the trial. This is as it should be;
the case can now be determined rapidly and on its merits rather than
on technicalities in procedure. Fewer miscarriages of justice result;
that party prevails whose position is supported by the facts, as both
indicating and subsumed under the applicable principles of law. At
least some of the hazards attendant upon litigation are eliminated;
and confidence in our courts as institutions of justice will be steadily
improved.
In speaking of the benefits resulting from the adoption of the
134
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Walter P. Armstrong stated:
"The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure deserves far greater public acclaim than it has yet
received. The Rules and Amendments constitute an epochal
law reform comparable to that of the English Judicature Act."
While the geographically limited scope of the work done by the
Supreme Court and Bar Association Committees in Florida does not,
of course, equal that of the Advisory Committee mentioned by Mr.
Armstrong, it is confidently expected that the benefits to the Florida
practice flowing from our reforms in civil procedure will measure
up, in quality and importance, to those experienced in the federal
practice.
lS 4 Congress Should Act, 35 A. B. A. J. 752 (1949). Mr. Armstrong, a former
president of the American Bar Association and for many years a member of the
board of editors of its Journal, died unexpectedly on July 27, 1949. The article

cited is his last.
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